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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
E. KEITH LIGNELL, MARIAN H.
LIGNELL,. his wife, BURTON M.
TODD and PHYLLIS h'. TODD,
his wife,
Plaintiffs and
Appellants,

*
*
*

v.

*

CLIFFORD M. BERG and WILLIAM
R. BERG, a partnership, dba
BERG BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, and FIDELITY AND
DEPOSIT COMPANY OF MARYLAND,
a corporation,

*

Defendants and
Respondents.

1-t r;? .'

*

ly'fg

Case No. 15001

*
*
*
*

ADDITIONAL PAGES 13-18

Plaintiffs are aware of no provision of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure that would permit Defendants-Respondents
to file a written supplement to either their oral argument
or their brief after the day of argument.l

If, however, the

Court is inclined to consider Defendants' "additional pages"
Plaintiffs submit the following to correct the erroneous conelusions contained therein.
Apparently Defendants, and possibly the Court, misconstrued the thrust of Plaintiffs' argument relating to attorney's
lRule 75(p) (3), U.R.C.P., authorizes corrections, but
not supplements.
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fees.

In this regard it is essential that the distinction be-

tween attorney's fees awarded as costs (§14-2-3) and attorney's
fees awarded as damages be kept in mind.

Plaintiffs readily

concede that both Defendants pleaded an entitlement to attorney's fees

("costs") under §14-2-3.

(Plaintiffs attached

copies of Defendants' counterclaims as an appendix to their
Supplemental Brief.)

Plaintiffs contend, however, that §14-2-3

does not authorize an award of attorney's fees on a Performance
Bond and thus Defendants would not be entitled to any award of
attorney's fees, either below or on appeal, based upon that
statute.

Further, Berg Brothers Construction (the partnership)

was not, as Defendants claim, the principal on that bond.

The

principal was Berg Construction Company (the joint venture).
Plaintiffs' second argument relates to Defendants' claim
that they are entitled to pass over to the Plaintiffs those attorney's fees awarded to the subcontractors.

As Plaintiffs

understand Defendants' contention they are seeking this pass
through not as costs under §14-2-3 but as damages for breach
of contract.
At oral argument Plaintiffs contended that the action of
the trial court awarding over the subcontractors' attorney's fees
was improper since Defendants failed to plead attorney's fees
as an element of their damages and provided no proof of this
matter

(as damages) at trial; further, the Court 2 made none of

2 Defendants erroneously contend in their "additional
pages" that plaintiffs asserted there were "no • • • findings
by Sponsored
Defendants-Respondents."
by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the necessary findings that would sustain such an award as
damages

(see Plaintiffs' Supplemental Br;ef),
~
an d ,

·

~n

any event,

that it was the duty and province of the jury to award defendants
their damages for the contract breach and it made no award of
attorney's fees.
Defendants' argument that they pleaded an entitlement
to attorney's fees does not solve the rest of the deficiencies
relating to the award over; nevertheless, it has the potential
of creating a gross misunderstanding with this Court.
Even in its supplement, Surety does not contend that it
made any claim for attorney's fees other than on the Performance
Bond under §14-2-3.

Berg Brothers Construction (the partnership)

claims, however, that it did make such claims.

A review of the

record indicates that the purported "cross-claim" against the
owners relating to the Comstock-Murray Electric action was never
served on plaintiffs or their counsel; rather, it was mailed to
Ron Spratling, attorney for Murray-Comstock (R. D31); thus,
clearly there was no properly pleaded claim over that would
sustain the pass through of the $21,000 in attorney's fees awarded the electricians, even if the other shortcomings did not
exist.
With relation to the drywallers' claim Berg apparently
did file a claim over.
prior to trial

Plaintiffs moved to dismiss that claim

(R. C780-781).

That matter was argued July 16,

1976, and is reported in pages 25-36 of the Supplemental Transcript (blue backing).

Plaintiffs there argued that any kind of
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a pass through to them was improper because a bond had been
posted which met the requirements of §14-2-2.

Defendants

stated that the cross-claim was intended to deal only with the
matter of extras under the construction contract and was simply
filed so that any extras proved by the subcontractors against
Berg would be considered in the overall accounting in the contract action between the owners and the contractor.

In this

regard Mr. Nebeker stated:
Mr. Nebeker:

"But the cross-claim is simply to say
that the determination on how much drywall he
is entitled to and how much the electrician is entitled to goes into the overall
accounting • • • " (Supp T.32)

Thereafter the following dialogue took place:
The Court:

Mr.

Nebeker:

As I understand your response, Mr. Nebeker,
it isn't really you don't take issue with
what Mr. Tanner has said
"
"Sure • • • " (Supp T.33)

Based upon this representation by Defendants) the trial court
denied Plaintiffs' motion as follows:
The Court:

Anything further on that motion, gentlemen?
The Court is going to deny that motion with
the explanation given of course that what
their intention is and the Court I think
understands it's merely what they want to
do and I'll limit it to that at the time
of trial.

Mr. Tanner:

As I understand the Court's ruling, it is
based upon the proposition that no such
claim as I was talking about is in fact
being made therefor?

3Mr. Beesley concurred in the representations of Mr.
Nebeker (Supp T.34-35).
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The Court:

R~ght.
They don't from their explanation
glven me, they don't claim any other than
that entitled to under the contract.

Mr. Tanner:

Thank you. Just want to make that clear.
(Supp T.36)

The record shows that Defendants did not intend to pass
through attorney's fees awarded to the subcontractors.

If they

at one time so intended that position was clearly abandoned at
the pre-trial.
Defendants' contention that evidence regarding attorney's
fees was not presented to the jury is true.

This was because

Defendants were not pressing any claim to fees other than as
costs under §14-2-3.
absolutely clear.

Judge Hall's finding number 11 makes this

The only claim for attorney's fees advanced at

trial by Defendants or the subcontractors was under §14-2-3 which
does not contain any provision that would authorize a pass
through.
In reviewing the record in preparation of this response
one additional fact of interest was discovered.
On August 15, 1975, Comstock and Murray Electric filed
an Amended Verified Complaint wherein they alleged in Paragraphs
2-5 that a joint venture existed between Clifford M. Berg,
William R. Berg and Frank

c.

Berg and that the joint venture

was the general contractor on the Incline Terrace Project.

In

response thereto Surety, by answer of December 23, 1975, admitted
the allegations contained in Murray-Comstock's Paragraphs 2-5
and only took exception to the stated contract amount (R. C335);
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therefore, Surety's contention at trial and on appeal that there
was no joint venture should be precluded by its previous admission that the joint venture did in fact exist.
Respectfully submitted,
EARL D. TANNER & ASSOCIATES
Earl D. Tanner
J. Thomas Bowen
Attorneys for Plaintiffs,
Lignell and Todd
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*

E. KEITH LIGNELL, MARIAN H.
LIGNELL, his wife, BURTON M.
TODD and PHYLLIS W. TODD,
his wife,

*

Plaintiffs and
Appellants,

*
*

v.

*

CLIFFORD M. BERG and
WILLIAM R. BERG, a partnership, dba BERG BROTHERS
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, and
FIDELITY AND DEPOSIT COMPANY
OF MARYLAlJD, a corporation,

*

Defendants and
Respondents.

Case No. 15001

*

*
*
*

APPELLANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF

Pursuant to the notice from the office of the Clerk of
the Court dated February 8, 1979, respecting further oral argument in this matter, plaintiffs-appellants submit the following
Brief on the question of the award of attorney's fees.
POINT I
ATTORNEY'S FEES ARE RECOVERABLE ONLY IN CERTAIN LIMITED
CIRCUMSTANCES.
It is a long established rule of this Court that attorney's fees are not recoverable within the action itself unless
expressly provided by contract or authorized by statute.
v. Culmer, 556 P.2d 498

(Utah 1976);

c.

~

G. Hormon Co. v. Lloyd,
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.
28 Utah 2d 112, 499 P.2d 124
16, 253 P.2d 372
(1891).

(1972); Hawkins v. Perry, 123 v1

(1953); Marks v. Culmer, 7 utah 163, 25 P, :.

This Court, however, apparently espouses the view t::

under certain circumstances attorney's fees may be awarded as
element of consequential damages if incurred in a separate ac
tion with a third party.

Pacific Coast Title Insurance

~.t

Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 7 Utah 2d 377, 325 P.2d
906

(1958).

Plaintiffs are aware of no provision that would

require this Court to award attorney's fees, thus even if a
party might qualify for attorney's fees on appeal, such an a1
is clearly discretionary with this Court.
Major-Blakeney Corp., 556 P.2d 1273

Downey State Bank

(Utah 1976); Swain v. Sai

Lake Real Estate & Investment Co., 3 Utah 2d 121, 279 P.2d Jl
(1955).

Plaintiffs submit, however, that the criteria foro:

party to qualify for an award of attorney's fees on appeal is
very limited and that defendants do not so qualify under the
facts of this case.

In the instant case it is undisputed tha

none of the contracts between the parties provided for an aw'
of attorney's fees;

therefore, any award must be justified as

an element of consequential damages or must be based upon

a'

ute.
POINT II
AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY ' S FEES AS AN ELEMENT OF CONSEQf:
TIAL DAMAGES WOULD NOT ENTITLE DEFENDANTS TO Al.'JY ATTORNEY'S
FEES ON APPEAL.
Although attorney's fees

·

~ncurre

d in another action;
~
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in some instances, be a proper element of consequential damages,
they can only be considered if such fees are reasonable, incurred in good faith and with a reasonable probability of success,
and were reasonably foreseeable by the parties.

Pacific coast

Title Ins. Co. v. Hartford Accident Indemnity Co., supra; Armstrong
Construction Co. v. Thompson, 390 P.2d 976
4 A.L.R.

3d 270

(1965).

(Wash. 1964); Annot.,

Fees incurred in prosecuting or defending

a case between the parties cannot, however, be awarded as an
element of consequential damages.

Defendants here, therefore,

would not be entitled to attorney's fees on appeal since such
attorney's fees would be "within the action itself" and are clearly precluded by the decisions of this Court.

Pacific Coast Title

Ins. Co. v. Hartford Accident Indemnity Co., supra.
A.

An award of attorney's fees as consequential damages

below would preclude both Berg and the surety from any award of
attorney's fees.
If this Court concludes that the attorney's fees were
awarded by the trial court as an element of consequential darnages the only portion of those fees that could be sustained against the owners would be those awarded to the electrical
contractor

($21,000.00) and to the drywaller ($11,000.00).

The

award by the trial court to the surety ($21,000.00) and to Berg
($21,000.00) could not be sustained because such an award would
be "within the action itself."

Even as an element of consequen-

tial damages, however, the assessment against the owners of the
attorney's fees awarded to the subcontractors would be improper
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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under the facts of this case and the state of the record.

B.

Neither Berg nor the surety pled nor proved
ney's fees as an element of consequential damages.

a~.

The counterclaims filed by Berg Brothers and the suret
request attorney's fees in the amount of $35,000.00 each under
the Labor and Material Bond statute, §14-2-3, u .C .A.

(Copies

,
0

the counterclaims are attached hereto as Appendix pages A-1 an 1
A-2).

Neither of the defendants requested that they be awardee

the attorney's fees incurred in their suits with the subcontra:
tors as an element of their damages.

Further, there is no

finding by the trial court in this matter that the fees were
incurred in good faith.

In fact,

the record indicates to the

contrary; the subcontractors, Berg Brothers and the surety
banded together against the owners
Plumbing

&

See Bryce

Heating Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 21 F.Supp. 81:

(D.C.S.C. 1938)
awardable) •

(Supp. T.lS).

(attorney's fees unnecessarily incurred not

There was no finding or evidence which would pern:

a determination of how much of the time and effort of the attcr
neys for the drywaller and the electrician was devoted to thei:
claims against the contractor and the surety and how much of
their time and effort was devoted to the various claims brough!
by them against the owners directly.

In the absence of such a

breakdown it is impossible to tell what portion of attorney's '·
awarded to the subcontractors would be properly included as an
element of consequential damages had that matter been raised a:
trial.

Further, there is no pleading and no finding bY the tr:
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court that the attorney's fees awarded to the subcontractors
against the surety were reasonably foreseeable at the time the
contract was made.l

Pacific Coast Title Ins. co. v. Hartford

Accident Indemnity Co., supra.
C.

The contract between the owners and the surety

specifically excludes an award of attorney's fees as an element
of consequential damages.
The Labor and Material Bond, as it relates to the obligation between the surety and the owners, provides:
"2.
The above named Principal and Surety hereby
jointly and severally agree with the Owner that every
claimant as herein defined, who has not been paid in
full before the expiration of a period of ninety (90)
days after the date on which the last of such claimant's work or labor was done or performed, or materials were furnished by such claimant, may sue on this
bond for the use of such claimant, prosectue the suit
to final judgment for such sum or sums as may be justly
due claimant, and have execution thereon. The Owner
shall not be liable for the payment of any costs or
expenses of any such suit."
(emphasis added) (See
Page A-5 in the appendix to the Appellants' Brief
where the Labor & Material Payment Bond is set forth
in its entirety.)
It is apparent, therefore, that the only contract between
the surety and the owners respecting attorney's fees required
the surety to save the owners harmless from all costs and expenses in suits brought by materialmen and laborers under that
bond.

This indicates that the surety, the owners and the prime

contractor all contemplated the possibility that there would
be costs and expenses incurred in suits by subcontractors

and

1 It is submitted that in this case it would have been
impossible to foresee that the bonding company would refuse
to pay claims which it believed to be fair and just and proper
in amount.
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specifically provided in the bond that the owners would not
be liable for such.

Therefore, even if this Court can igMn

the fact that no request was made below by defendants for an
award of attorney's fees as consequential damages, no findings
were made by the trial court respecting that issue and no
findings were made by the court which would support an award
of consequential damages, the clear language of the contract
between the parties would preclude such an award and should be
controlling with respect to that issue.
If this Court were inclined to the belief that the con·
tractor and surety should be entitled to recover as consequential damages the attorney's fees awarded to the subcontractors
below, this cause would have to be remanded for evidence and
findings on (1)

the good faith of the surety in requiring Ue

subcontractors to go to trial on their claims under the bond,
(2) the portion of subcontractors' time spent pursuing the
bond claims as distinguished from that spent pursuing the man)'
causes of action pleaded by the subcontractors against the
owners, 2 all of which were successfully defended by the owners,
who received judgment of "no cause," and (3) the foreseeabilit
of the surety's action in refusing to pay subcontractors evu
though surety believed the subcontractors' claims to be merit·
orious.

2uo evidence was adduced at the trial on this alloca·
tion, the award was for all services rendered, without
pro-rating.
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POINT III
SECTION 14-2-3, U.C.A., DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR AN AWARD
OF ATTORNEY'S FEES BELOW OR ON APPEAL UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES
OF THIS CASE.
Even if this Court concludes that the award of attorney's fees below was based upon §14-2-3, and was not an element
of consequential damages, defendants still would not be entitled
to attorney's fees on appeal.
A.

Under statutes such as §14-2-3, U.C.A., no award

can be made for attorney's fees incurred on appeal.
A recent Florida case has met head-on the question of
the award of attorney's fees for services of attorneys on appeal.
Section 84w291 of the Florida Statutes, a statute similar to
our §38-1-18, u.c.A., states:
"In any action brought to enforce a lien under
this chapter, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services
of his attorney, to be determined by the court which
shall be taxed as part of his costs."
The District Court of Appeals for the First District in John T.
Wood Homes, Inc. v. Air Control Products, Inc., 177 So.2d 709
(Fla. 1965), held that such a statute would not permit the allowance of attorney's fees for services on appeal.

This holding

was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Florida in Sunbeam Enterprises, Inc. v. Upthegrove, 316 so.2d 34 (Fla. 1975), citing
inter alia, a united States Supreme Court case which held that
the "American rule" respecting the award of attorney's fees was
that, since statutes providing for the award of attorney's fees
-7-
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were in derogation of the common law, they should be strict),
construed.

The Supreme Court of Florida held:

"[2]
This Court has consistently held that the
award of attorney's fees is in derogation of
the common law and that statutes allowing for
the award of such fees should be strictly construed.
Weathers, for Use and Benefit of Ocean
Accident & Guarantee Corp. v. Cauthen, 152 Fla.
420, 12 So.2d 294 (1943); Great American Indemnity Co. v. Williams, et al., 85 So.2d 619 (Fla.
1956); Kittel v. Kittel, 210 So.2d l (Fla. 1968);
Stone v. Jeffres, 208 So.2d 827 (Fla. 1968). See
also Jackson v. Hatch, supra.
"[3]
We agree with petitioner that the District
Court erred in awarding attorney's fees on appeal
to respondent since Section 713.29 (formally §84.2911
does not expressly authorize the award of attorney's
fees on appeal and we would adopt the reasoning of
the District Court of Appeals, First District, in
John T. Wood Homes, Inc. v. Air Control Products,
Inc., that ' • • • the statute by not specifically
setting out attorney's fees incurred on appeal would
not encompass the allowance of such a fee.' Accord,
Babe's Plumbing, Inc. v. Maier, supra.
See, Alyeska
Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, et al.,
421 u.s. 240, 95 s.ct. 1612, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975),
Supreme Court of the United States, opinion filed
May 1 2 , 1 9 7 5 • "
There have been numerous cases in Utah respecting the
award of attorney's fees to the "successful party" under
§38-1-18 relating to mechanic's liens foreclosure.

None ap-

pear to deal with the award of attorney' s fees for services c·
appeal.

See, e.g. , Palombi v. D

&

C Builders, 2 2 Utah 2d 29i,

452 P.2d 325 (1969).
Plaintiffs submit that when dealing with attorney's
fees awardable by statute the "Florida rule" is correct and
that the provisions of §38-l-18, and those of its

· t r stat:·
e

SlS

§14-2-3, relating to labor and rna terial claims under the JJonc:
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statute, should be strictly construed as in derogation of the
common law and that no attorney's fees for services in an
appeal should be taxable as costs on appeal in the absence of
express statutory authority to that effect.

In cases involving

contract provisions for attorney's fees, however, such an award
for appellate services would be a matter of the discretion of
the court.

Swain v. Salt Lake Real Estate Board, supra (attor-

ney's fees denied).

Of course, in this case there is no such

contractual provision.
B.

An award of attorney's fees below based on §14-2-3

would preclude the pass through of the subcontractors' fees to
the owners.
If the award of attorney's fees below was based upon the
bond statute, a conclusion which plaintiffs contend cannot be
supported by the record of this case since the action between
plaintiffs and defendants surety and contractor was not an action
based upon a Labor and Material Payment Bond but, rather, was
based upon a Performance Bond

(see Appellants' Brief, pp. 46-58

and Appellants' Reply Brief, pp. 29-34), the award over of the
attorney's fees with relation to the electrical subcontractor and
the drywaller must be reversed.

There is no provision in that

statute, nor any other, for the contractor and the surety to
recover over against the owners the attorney's fees awarded to
the subcontractors whom they failed and refused to pay.

Such

recovery over can only be obtained by pleading and proving a
claim for consequential damages as has been discussed above.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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~

statutes to Performance Bonds would be injudicious.
Plaintiffs have previously argued in their Brief that
the attorney's fees provisions of §14-2-3 should

not be ex-

panded to include suits by an Owner against his prime contrac:
and surety under a construction contract and Performance Bone,
Such an expansion would be in derogation of the common law ru:
and subject to the rule that statutes providing for attorney''
fees should be construed strictly.
Further, this Court should be particularly careful no:
to write into the contractor's bond statute or the Performance
Bond contract a provision permitting the successful

party~~

suit on a Performance Bond to recover attorney's fees.

This

would open the doors for any successful owner bringing suit
on a Performance Bond to recover, in addition to the principal
obligation, its attorney's fees.

The bonding companies have

specifically left such a provision out of their contract. ~
such provision appears in the statutes and even if it did it
would be subject to strict construction.

Nonetheless, ilie

trial court made an award of attorney's fees as part of the
costs in this case.

This award is erroneous and should ~

reversed and there should be no attorney's fees award to eith'
the appellant or respondent for the services of its attorneys
below or on appeal.
In addition, the mere fact that the cases were

combini

.
. t. on bet•'
for trial would not justify obliterating the d~st~nc ~
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the essential elements of the causes of action pursued by the
subcontractors and the claim made on the Performance Bond and
the principal contract between the owners and the prime contractor.
D.

The owners were awarded their costs against the

subcontractors.
As has been noted, under §14-2-3 attorney's fees are
awarded to the successful party and taxed as costs.

The owners

were the "successful party" in all of the suits brought by the
subcontractors against them and the trial court awarded the
owners their costs against those subcontractors.

As this Court

recognized a long time ago, in any lawsuit there can only be
one "prevailing party" so far as costs are concerned.
v. Collins, 78 Utah 93, 1 P.2d 950 (1931).

Checketts

Thus, i t would be

improper now,_ under the guise of the bonding statute, to assess
against the "prevailing party" i.e. the owners, those attorney's
fees awarded as costs to the subcontractors in their suits with
Berg and the surety.
E.

The clerk's notice appears to preclude an award

under §14-2-3.
The notice prepared by the Clerk of the Supreme Court
requests information on the issue of the award of attorney's
fees as distinguished from those assessed as damages.

Since an

award under §14-2-3 is not assessed as damages but is taxed as
costs, plaintiffs assume that the real area of inquiry by this
Court is that of attorney's fees as consequential damages and
not attorney's
fees as costs under §14-2-3.
If so,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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defendants-respondents clearly would not be entitled to fees
on appeal.
CONCLUSION

,sr-

,......Jer afffO p_r ia/t.. e. ire u fit t.S1
The contractor and surety mayll'be entitled to an awar:
below of attorney's fees as consequential damages; however,
there is no pleading nor proof relating to that matter at th:
point in the litigation.

In addition, such a theory of reco

ery would clearly preclude an award of attorney's fees to U;
contractor and surety below and would preclude an award of a:
torney' s fees on appeal.

Even if the award of attorney's fe,

below is held to have been based upon the statute, §14-2-3, •
further award of attorney's on appeal would be precluded by
the Florida rationale and the pass-through of the subcontrac·.
or's fees

(some $32,000.00) as "costs" would have to be reve:

Plaintiffs respectfully submit that no theory that h
appeared in the case so far would sustain an award of additr
fees on appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
EARL D. TANNER & ASSOCIATES
Earl D. Tanner
J. Thomas Bowen
Attorneys for Plaintiffs,
Lignell and Todd
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the e.:.\::ctri<.:J.l .5ubc:ontr.:..c:tcrs,

qu!.t

and 'valk vtf the joO and delJ.•; the const:::-uc:ior. oE ·:h.c

Plaint::..ffs have f<liled co pay in Euil for t!"le 'Nark

t:~crfor:r.cd and :nat~rial

furnished Jy said subcontr.J.ctor;;, all of whicn 3.~ts of interference ,.,ere
contrary to the terms of the .:ontract and caused ti1e said subconcractors
<;o file 5uit ag.:.1inst the plaintiffs and also upon c:-te pay:n.;nc bor:.d issue.i

by this :.:iefendan:. D~£endant deni~s th~ al.!.egatio:1s of ?.lrJ.grnphs 12 a.nd.

13.
COUNTERC:O.\IC!

Defendant complains of che plaintiffs

c:..

Keith Lignel!. ana

:-farl.on H. Lignell, his wife, and Burton ~!. Todd and ?hylii..:; ;.;, Tocili, his ·.o~ife,

and alleges
1.

fallows:

J.S

Defendant incorporates ~erein its answers c:o para:;raphs 12.

and 13 oi Plaintiffs' Third Cause of Action.
2.

Defendant furnished its ?erformance and pay~enc bone!.

pursuant to Chapc.ar 2 of Title 1.:0, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.

The :H:acuc.~

provides as follows:
In any action Jroughc upon che bond provic!eci f~r
under ~his chapter the successful pc.rcy shall be ~ntitled
to recover a reasonable ac.tornoe,•' s feoe co be fixed Jv
the court, which shall be c.axeci, as coscs in ti':.e acti~n.
(14-2-3)

J.

Plaintiffs still owe the subcontracc.ors Copiaga J.nd Gree!\·•.:ood

and Comstock Electric and

~turray

E:lectric a sum of money ior the ·,..rork

performed by said suOcontractors on che Incline Terrace .\parc.me!\C.S, and
plainc.iffs furc.her owe Berg Broc.hers Construction Company a surn. of

for the -.... ark performed by the g.::1eral conc.raccor J.S

allee;~d

~oney

in their

separate Complaints filed herein.
4..

Pursuant co the provisions of 14-2-J, chis d~~e!l.c!o.n~ is

entitled to recover a reasonable attorneys

1

f~e

to

b~

fix~d

by c.h.c. :our::

r.Jhich defendant J.ll~ges to be tne sur.~ of $35,000 for :JCcurnl.lys' ~·~~~ . md

expenses.
r,·!HEREFORE, defendant Fid~licy and D~posit Cvmpany of ~!.:1:yl ...md

CounterclaLrn of

Sure~y
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as ;ollows:
Defe::.dan~s

1,

lnccr;.crata r.crel:l. t:1elr answers to

;Jarag:a~n 5 .

Constructio:l Cor..pa;-.y c..s ;:r:.:-;.c:..pais 0:1 :.1e :::e:-:or:-:-.a:-.ce and ;:.aywe:-.t::·

·: 1953, The stat\.4te ;Jrov:..das as :o.~.lows:
11

In any act1on ~rou:;:~:-.: :..!(:0:1 L~e ':.lonG ::rovj,ded :or under thls
chapter t.-.a .5t...;.c;:ess::..;.l. _:.o.r:y s:1ad be e;-.tj,t.aC. :o recover a

reasonable at:c~:-.ey 's :ae ':o ':Je :~eC. ':Jy ::-.a
shaH be taxed 55 costs :.:-. :r.e acr..o.cn.

co~,

wh1ch

( 14-2-3)"

3,

Plaintlifs a<: the ::resent t:ir..e ewe ::-.a

s~Dconr.ractors Co~L.·;:

Greenwood and Comstoc.< 'Slactr;.c and :VIurray Zlec:ti.c a sum of wor.e(:

I work.

~erformed

"~~ pla1ntiifs

by said silbcontractors on ::--,a I:1cl:..ne :'errace Apart::-.a~.::

further owe Berg 3rot:-tersco::structlon Co;-r-.?any a s~,;.:n of c.oi.:

,,
]i work t:leriormed by the ger.aral

I[

~or.t:actcr as alle~ed

::1

i)r:.c: Co:n?:a::.:;

:; claims and Countarc~ai:T.s :!.lad :.-..era:.n,
li

,I

'I
I!

4,

:ito recover

?ursuant to t:,e ;:rovlSlons oi l_,-2-3, ::.-..ese defendar.ts ;.:i·
a reasona~la a :t.:rneys' :ee to :,a f.l..x:ed. by the

I·
:·i allege to be the S'l:n of $35

,ceo. 00

co~ wh.lc~~·:~

:cr attorr.eys' ;ees and expenses,

Defendants inccr;crate here1n all af:u-:r.at:ve deienses, cross·
: countercla1ms wr.1c:. .-.ave ;::::rev:ous1y jeen

al~cged

aga1nst ::1e

:· L1gc.ell and Todd,

A-2
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